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[ Judges are] the ones who get you . . . and I would be scared to death if I let a judge 
I’m in front of know that I’m HIV positive.1 
In the epigraph above, an HIV-positive woman voices her fear that the 
protection of the law would give way if her fate were entrusted to a decision 
maker aware of her HIV status. More than thirty years into the epidemic, many 
readers may think this fear overblown. But it feels all too legitimate in light of my 
own experience. 
I was diagnosed with HIV in 2010, during a health exam required by a South 
Korean government program that had hired me to teach English—and which 
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1. C.L. Galletly & J. Dickson-Gomez, HIV Seropositive Status Disclosure to Prospective Sex Partners 
and Criminal Laws That Require It: Perspectives of Persons Living with HIV, 20 INT’L J. STD & AIDS 613, 
616 (2009). 
            
494 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:493 
immediately fired me for my HIV status. On the morning of the day I was 
terminated, an HIV services worker left me with a reminder that South Korea had 
recently enacted a law to prohibit HIV discrimination. I mentioned this law in a 
meeting with the Korean government official who fired me. I mentioned, as well, 
the fact that HIV-positive teachers pose no risk of transmission to their 
students—a fact confirmed by the official’s own aide. Undeterred, the official told 
me that he could not allow me to work in his schools. He warned of the uproar 
my HIV status would cause in the community when it became public, and—
implying he still viewed me as a threat to students—assured me that, if necessary, 
he would publicize my status himself.2 
Though this experience occurred in South Korea, I soon learned that the 
Korean official’s beliefs and attitudes remain common in the United States, 
lending credence to the HIV-positive woman’s fear of revealing her status to an 
American judge. Despite ever-advancing science on HIV transmission risks,3 
many Americans remain ignorant of transmission facts established even in the 
early years of the epidemic—ignorance reflected in their fear of casual contact 
with the HIV-positive.4 Further, though public health experts have long 
acknowledged the limited benefits of practicing safer sex with (or rejecting) only 
partners known to be HIV positive,5 many Americans react with excessive 
condemnation and even violence toward HIV-positive people they feel have 
“deceived” others into consensual sex.6 And while many HIV-positive Americans 
continue to face discrimination of the most material sorts,7 these experiences are 
 
2. I include this personal account for two reasons. First, I argue in this Note that greater 
attention to the lived experiences of the HIV-positive can improve legal commentary and judicial 
decisions. See infra Part II.C. It thus seems appropriate to claim attention for such experience—
including my own—in this Note. Second, by opening with my story, I am attempting to provide a 
counterpoint to a stigmatizing trend in HIV legal commentary: articles opening with stories of HIV-
positive people infecting others. See, e.g., Mona Markus, A Treatment for the Disease: Criminal HIV 
Transmission/Exposure Laws, 23 NOVA L. REV. 847, 847–48 (1999); Erin McCormick, Note, 
Strengthening the Effectiveness of California’s HIV Transmission Statute, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 407, 
407–08 (2013). Of course, I am indebted to critical race theorists and other scholars who have 
claimed a space for personal narrative in legal commentary. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for 
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2411–15, 2435–40 (1988). 
3. See infra pp. 502–03. 
4. A national survey conducted in 2011 found that many Americans remain unaware that HIV 
cannot be transmitted through sharing a toilet seat, swimming pool, or drinking glass with an HIV-
positive person. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HIV/AIDS AT 30: A PUBLIC 
OPINION PERSPECTIVE 6 (June 2011). Many respondents also expressed discomfort (presumably 
rooted in fears of transmission) at the prospect of an HIV-positive coworker or roommate, as well as 
fear of HIV-positive people teaching their children or preparing their food. Id. at 7. 
5. See infra pp. 507–08. 
6. E.g., Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence in the 
Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1169–71 (2009); Erin Seatter, When Disclosure Is 
Dangerous: Remembering Cicely Bolden, POSITIVE WOMEN’S NETWORK (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://www.pwn.bc.ca/2012/09/when-disclosure-is-dangerous/#.U__jqUu0b1o (reflecting on news 
that a sexual partner of Cicely Bolden stabbed her to death after she informed him she was HIV-
positive, and reporting that some Twitter users said Bolden deserved to be murdered). 
7. E.g., Brad Sears, HIV Discrimination in Health Care Services in Los Angeles County: The Results of 
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often overlooked or minimized as relics of the epidemic’s early years, facilitating 
their continued occurrence.8 
My growing awareness of these problems, spurred by my own experience of 
discrimination, led me to explore how American legal professionals perceive HIV 
and the HIV-positive, focusing on the manner in which judges deciding the fates 
of HIV-positive litigants engage with legal doctrine, public health knowledge, and 
the reality of HIV-positive lives. In exploring these questions, I found fertile 
ground in cases and commentaries concerning “HIV criminalization.” The term 
refers to the criminal prosecution of HIV-positive people, or the enhancement of 
HIV-positive defendants’ sentences, for conduct exposing others to real or 
perceived risks of HIV transmission.9 HIV exposure prosecutions most 
commonly target conduct, such as spitting and biting, that forcibly exposes others 
to the HIV-positive defendant’s body fluids (albeit in a manner posing little or no 
risk of transmission),10 or consensual sexual conduct not prefaced by the 
“disclosure”11 of the HIV-positive defendant’s status.12 The defendant may be 
charged under statutes specifically targeting forms of HIV exposure and/or under 
general criminal statutes criminalizing, for instance, assault and reckless 
endangerment.13 Empirical studies suggest that HIV criminalization does little or 
 
Three Testing Studies, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 85, 96–104 (2008) (finding that 56% 
of skilled nursing facilities, 26% of plastic and cosmetic surgeons, and 47% of obstetricians in Los 
Angeles County refused to provide services to any HIV-positive person); U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil 
Rights Div., DOJ HIV/AIDS Enforcement, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/aids/ada_aids 
_enforcement.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2014) (listing settlement agreements and consent decrees 
entered into by the Department of Justice in HIV discrimination cases, including twelve between the 
years of 2010 and 2013). 
8. See Mark E. Wojcik, Some Lessons Learned from the AIDS Pandemic, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
63, 65 (2010) (recognizing that discrimination may still occur from time to time but claiming that 
“we” now have basic transmission knowledge, respect medical privacy for the HIV-positive, and feel 
no need to exclude the HIV-positive from schools, homes, churches, and places of employment). 
9. See Angela Perone, From Punitive to Proactive: An Alternative Approach for Responding to HIV 
Criminalization That Departs from Penalizing Marginalized Communities, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 363, 
372–79 (2013). 
10. See, e.g., HIV Transmission Risk, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/risk.html (last updated July 11, 2013). 
11. I distance myself from the term “disclosure” for two reasons. First, it is ambiguous; if I list 
my HIV-positive status on an online profile and have sex with a partner met through that profile, 
without mentioning my status in person or in a direct message, have I “disclosed”? Second, it equates 
behaviors of differing moral dimensions: the person who remains silent about her HIV status with a 
casual partner who does not raise the subject is just as guilty of “nondisclosure” as one who lies about 
her status when asked by a monogamous partner. 
12. See Prosecutions and Arrests for HIV Exposure in the United States, 2008–2014, CENTER FOR 
HIV L. & POL’Y, http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/prosecutions-and-arrest-hiv-exposure-
united-states-2008%E2%80%932013-list-center-hiv-law-policy (last visited Jan. 5, 2014). 
13. See id. For a brief but well-researched history of the enactment of HIV-specific statutes by 
state legislatures, see Sergio Hernandez, Sex, Lies and HIV: When What You Don’t Tell Your Partner Is a 
Crime, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 1, 2013, 10:58 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/hiv-criminal-
transmission. Most HIV-specific criminal statutes criminalize sexual activity—defined to varying 
degrees of specificity—without “disclosure,” usually providing no affirmative defense where the risk 
of sexual transmission is greatly reduced by condom use or the defendant’s undetectable viral load. See 
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nothing to promote safer behaviors, and in fact may undermine public health by 
promoting unhealthy practices, such as the avoidance of HIV testing.14 
Nevertheless, as of October 2013, forty-three states were known to criminalize 
HIV exposure under general statutes, HIV-specific statutes, or both.15 
I argue in this Note that judicial decisions and legal commentary concerning 
HIV criminalization often exhibit failures to engage with public health knowledge, 
including contemporary research on HIV transmission and sexual health 
strategies. Moreover, they suffer from a failure to engage with the experience and 
perspectives of HIV-positive people. These failures lead to unjust convictions and 
sentences in HIV exposure prosecutions, impoverished legal analysis, and the 
perpetuation of mistaken or outdated thought on HIV transmission and sexual 
health. By identifying recurring manifestations of these failures and their 
consequences, I hope to provide evidence of the need for interventions into 
judicial decision making in HIV exposure prosecutions, and thus generate support 
for proposed interventions such as the Repeal Existing Policies that Encourage 
and Allow Legal HIV Discrimination Act of 2013 (REPEAL Act).16 I further 
hope that my identification and critique of recurring issues can contribute to 
discussions that will render such interventions more effective when they take 
place. 
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I briefly describes recent advocacy 
against HIV criminalization, focusing on government interventions such as the 
REPEAL Act, and argues that legal commentary on HIV criminalization has not 
fully realized its potential to inform such interventions because it has devoted 
relatively little attention to judicial decision making. In Part II, I examine recent 
appellate opinions rendered in HIV exposure prosecutions, along with related 
cases and commentaries, to identify recurring failures to engage with public health 
knowledge and HIV-positive perspectives. In Part III, I draw on Suzanne 
Goldberg’s work on judicial intuitions in sexual orientation cases17 to offer brief 
thoughts on how legal professionals might encourage judges’ engagement with 
these sources of knowledge. Finally, I conclude in Part IV with an anecdote from 
an AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) lawyer and an appeal to the 
profession. 
 
Perone, supra note 9, at 373–75. Many statutes also criminalize the nonsexual transmission of body 
fluids, often targeting behaviors, such as spitting, that pose no scientifically proven risk of HIV 
transmission. See id. Some states have also adopted statutes that punish HIV-positive individuals for 
engaging in sex work, while others have enacted laws enhancing the penalty for sex offenses if the 
defendant is HIV-positive. See id. at 375–76, 378–79. 
14. Patrick O’Byrne et al., HIV Criminal Prosecutions and Public Health: An Examination of the 
Empirical Research, 39 MED. HUMAN. 85, 88 (2013). 
15. HIV Criminalization by State Map, LAWATLAS, http://www.lawatlas.org/preview?dataset= 
hiv-criminalization-statutes (last updated Oct. 2013). 
16. H.R. 1843, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1790, 113th Cong. (2013). 
17. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1375 (2010). 
            
2014] JUDGING HIV CRIMINALIZATION 497 
I. INTERVENTIONS INTO HIV CRIMINALIZATION 
The number of HIV exposure prosecutions has risen internationally in 
recent years, and research on HIV criminalization has also increased.18 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, HIV criminalization has been a focus of recent advocacy by 
and for the HIV-positive. The Positive Justice Project, a national 
anticriminalization initiative, was launched by the Center for HIV Law and Policy 
in 2010,19 and its launch was soon followed by the founding of the Sero Project, 
which also focused on advocacy against HIV criminalization.20 Organizations not 
dedicated to the issue have recognized it as a priority as well: for instance, in a 
2013 letter urging the LGBT community to renew its commitment to HIV issues, 
a group of LGBT and HIV organizations called for policymakers to “stop HIV 
criminalization.”21 
This growing momentum in advocacy against HIV criminalization is 
apparent within the government as well. Though the federal government endorsed 
HIV criminalization early in the epidemic,22 the Obama Administration has taken 
a stance against it since at least 2010. In a section on reducing HIV stigma and 
discrimination, President Obama’s 2010 National HIV/AIDS Strategy 
acknowledges that, “[i]n many instances, the continued existence and enforcement 
of [HIV-specific criminal] laws run counter to scientific evidence about routes of 
HIV transmission and may undermine the public health goals of promoting HIV 
screening and treatment.”23 Accordingly, the National Strategy recommends that 
“[s]tate legislatures should consider reviewing HIV-specific criminal statutes.”24 
Since the release of the National Strategy, federal officials have taken a broader 
stance against HIV criminalization, calling for the elimination of HIV-specific 
criminal laws rather than their review.25 
Congress has recently taken action against HIV criminalization as well. An 
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014 (NDAA) requires 
the military to review the Uniform Code of Military Justice, related policies, and 
 
18. O’Byrne et al., supra note 14, at 85. 
19. Beirne Roose-Snyder et al., The Positive Justice Project: A New National Campaign to End 
Exceptionalist Criminal Law Treatment of People with HIV, CENTER FOR HIV L. & POL’Y (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/fine-print-blog/positive-justice-project-new-national-campaign-
end-exceptionalist-criminal-law. 
20. What We Do, SERO, http://seroproject.com/what-we-do/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2014). 
21. Michael Adams et al., We the LGBT, POZ (June 3, 2013), http://www.poz.com/ 
articles/we_the_lgbt_2676_24001.shtml. 
22. Sarah J. Newman, Note, Prevention, Not Prejudice: The Role of Federal Guidelines in HIV-
Criminalization Reform, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1411–17 (2013). 
23. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POL’Y, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR 
THE UNITED STATES 37 (July 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/NHAS.pdf. 
24. Id. 
25. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HIV/AIDS, RESOLUTION ON ENDING 
FEDERAL AND STATE HIV-SPECIFIC CRIMINAL LAWS, PROSECUTIONS, AND CIVIL COMMITMENTS 
2 (Feb. 2013), available at http://aids.gov/federal-resources/pacha/meetings/2013/feb-2013-
criminalization-resolution.pdf. 
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court martial decisions to ensure that they demonstrate medically accurate 
understandings of HIV and public health, and to prepare recommendations to 
ensure that laws and policies regarding HIV-positive service members accord with 
contemporary understandings of HIV transmission and treatment.26 Though the 
NDAA’s intervention into HIV criminalization will be limited to the military, 
Congress is also considering an intervention at the state level: the REPEAL Act. 
Originally introduced by Representative Barbara Lee in 2011,27 the REPEAL Act 
was reintroduced in both the House and the Senate in 2013.28 If passed, the 
REPEAL Act would require certain federal agencies to conduct a review of state 
HIV criminalization law, assessing whether it demonstrates an evidence-based 
understanding of HIV transmission and the multiple factors affecting it, the health 
consequences of HIV infection in light of contemporary treatment and support 
services, and the impact of such law on public health.29 The agencies would also 
be tasked with evaluating state laws from the perspective of HIV-positive 
defendants’ civil rights, assessing whether the laws reflect an understanding of 
their impact on HIV-positive people and their communities, and whether the 
punishments inflicted are proportional to those imposed for comparable or more 
serious offenses, such as drunk driving and exposure to other communicable 
diseases.30 The agencies’ review would not be toothless; the REPEAL Act directs 
the agencies to issue best practice recommendations and guidance to state 
governments for use in criminal cases involving the HIV-positive, and to establish 
a system for monitoring statewide implementation of the best practice 
recommendations.31 Despite its name, the REPEAL Act looks well beyond the 
possibility of repealing (or amending) HIV-specific criminal statutes: its review 
would encompass state “laws, policies, regulations, and judicial precedents and 
decisions.”32 Accordingly, it instructs the reviewing agencies to consult with and 
seek the participation of state judges, and to include recommendations for judges 
in the required set of best practice recommendations.33 
If the REPEAL Act were passed, its review and recommendations could be 
informed by legal commentary on HIV criminalization.34 Margo Kaplan has 
 
26. H.R. 1960, 113th Cong. § 550F (2013); see also Sean Strub, The U.S. Military and HIV: A 
Huge Step Forward, SEANSTRUB (Dec. 20. 2013), http://www.seanstrub.com/blog/us-military-hiv-
huge-step-forward. 
27. H.R. 3053, 112th Cong. (2011). 
28. H.R. 1843, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1790, 113th Cong. (2013). 
29. H.R. 1843 § 4(a)–(b). 
30. See id. 
31. H.R. 1843 § 4(a)–(d). 
32. Id. § 4(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
33. Id. § 4(a)(2), (b)(3). 
34. The REPEAL Act provides that the reviewing agencies may use “existing reviews of 
criminal and related civil commitment cases involving people living with HIV/AIDS,” including 
reviews conducted by legal advocacy, public health, or trade organizations. Id. § 4(a)(3). Even if law 
review articles do not constitute such reviews, they could inform the views of the various stakeholders 
the reviewing agencies are instructed to consult, including legal advocacy organizations that work with 
HIV-positive people. Id. § 4(a)(2)(G). 
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usefully summarized the legal scholarship on HIV criminalization by dividing it 
into two branches, addressing distinct questions: whether HIV exposure should be 
criminalized at all, and, if so, what conduct should be criminalized.35 While Kaplan 
is likely correct that these are the two primary questions addressed in the HIV 
criminalization literature, the scholarship also touches on a third important 
question for legal interventions: assuming that certain conduct creating risks of 
HIV transmission is to be criminalized, how should it be criminalized? More 
specifically, should the conduct be prosecuted under HIV-specific statutes, or 
under general criminal statutes such as those criminalizing assault and reckless 
endangerment? Several commentators have specifically addressed this question, 
with some favoring the use of general criminal law,36 and others arguing in 
support of targeted statutes.37 
I call attention to this debate to remind advocates that criminalization can be 
carried out in various ways, limiting policymakers’ ability to reign in overzealous 
prosecutors through legislative reform alone. For instance, Sara Klemm has 
pointed out that in Maryland, where the state’s HIV-specific statute is drawn to 
criminalize only a narrow category of conduct, prosecutors have elected to charge 
HIV-positive defendants under general criminal statutes instead of—or in addition 
to—charging them under the state’s HIV-specific law.38 Maryland is not alone; 
LawAtlas indicates that twenty states that have enacted HIV-specific criminal 
statutes have continued to prosecute HIV exposure under general criminal law as 
well.39 Prosecutors’ potential turn to general criminal law gives weight to Kaplan’s 
concern that even after HIV-specific laws are reformed, injustices will continue 
due to the influence of HIV stigma on decisions by judges and juries.40 
Indeed, the relatively few commentaries focused on prosecutions under 
general criminal laws have taken issue with judges’ application of these laws to 
HIV exposure.41 Most notably, in an analysis of aggravated assault prosecutions 
 
35. Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. 1517, 1519–20 (2013). 
36. E.g., Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial, 39 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 515–16 (2007); James B. McArthur, Note, As the Tide Turns: The Changing 
HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 740–41 
(2009); W. Thomas Minahan, Disclosure Before Exposure: A Review of Ohio’s HIV Criminalization Statutes, 
35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 83, 104–05 (2009). 
37. E.g., Sara Klemm, Comment, Keeping Prevention in the Crosshairs: A Better HIV Exposure Law 
for Maryland, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 495, 519–24 (2010); Jodi Mosiello, Note, Why The 
Intentional Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Should Be Criminalized Through the 
Use of Specific HIV Criminal Statutes, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 595, 604–05, 609–12 (1999); 
Newman, supra note 22, at 1427–28. 
38. Klemm, supra note 37, at 514–15 & n.158; see also Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime 
and Punishment: Is There a Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 858 
(2004) (reporting that, in a notorious “nondisclosure” case, New York prosecutors relied on general 
criminal law rather than the state’s STI-specific misdemeanor statute). 
39. HIV Criminalization by State Map, supra note 15. 
40. See Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1553 (“[A statutory framework requiring] an individualized 
inquiry of risk may not be sufficient to ensure only those who pose substantial and unjustifiable risk 
of transmission are convicted. Finders of fact may still be swayed by fear and prejudice.”). 
41. See Isabel Grant, Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in HIV 
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for biting and for sex without disclosure, Ari Ezra Waldman exposes two 
recurring errors in these prosecutions that are “products of [judicial] interpretation 
rather than the governing regime itself.”42 He points to five cases demonstrating 
“a tendency toward error that even more specific [statutory] drafting could not 
resolve,” advising jurisdictions that continue to prosecute HIV exposure under 
general criminal law to “recognize the potential logical fallacies and due process 
errors that can occur [in judicial decision making] and guard against them.”43 Of 
course, the fact that even the most carefully drafted statutes leave room for unjust 
decision making should not dissuade advocates from prioritizing the repeal or 
amendment of statutes that mandate unjust decisions; as Kaplan argues, “[A] 
statute that may be interpreted in a way that is overbroad is better than a statute 
that is necessarily overbroad.”44 Nonetheless, as Waldman suggests, advocates 
should also look beyond statutory terms to recognize and guard against problems 
that arise when judges interpret and apply those statutes. 
Other commentators, however, have done little to diagnose problematic 
judicial decision making in HIV exposure prosecutions, or to propose solutions. 
When most commentators note problems in judicial decision making, they do so 
only in passing.45 Further, some commentators have attributed the potential for 
biased decision making only to nonjudicial actors,46 or have minimized the issue’s 
 
Nondisclosure Prosecutions, 54 MCGILL L.J. 389, 395–403 (2009) (arguing that trial judge should have 
recognized condom use as defense for sex without “disclosure” and should not have factored viral 
load into analysis); Scott A. McCabe, Rejecting Inference of Intent to Murder for Knowingly Exposing Another to 
a Risk of HIV Transmission, 56 MD. L. REV. 762, 779 (1997) (concluding that court properly refused to 
infer intent to kill from condomless sex but arguing it should have clarified that HIV exposure alone 
can never support inference of intent to kill); Joshua D. Talicska, Note, Criminal Charges with Too Much 
Bite: Why Charging and Convicting HIV-Positive Biters and Spitters of Attempted Murder Is Unjustifiable, 12 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 461, 476–81 (criticizing judges for affirming attempted murder convictions for 
spitting and biting without applying “obvious impossibility” exception). 
42. Ari Ezra Waldman, Exceptions: The Criminal Law’s Illogical Approach to HIV-Related 
Aggravated Assaults, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 550, 595–96 (2011). First, judges have relieved 
prosecutors of their duty to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, a likelihood of harm, instead requiring 
only proof of a possibility of transmission. Id. at 565–68. Second, judges have convicted defendants on 
the basis of generalized evidence regarding average risks of transmission, as opposed to assessing the 
specific transmission risks posed by a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 565, 568–72. 
43. Id. at 600. 
44. See Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1553 (emphasis omitted). 
45. See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 36, at 471–72, 508 n.165 (noting that judges are poor at 
accurately assessing transmission risks); Harlon L. Dalton, Shaping Responsible Behavior: Lessons from the 
AIDS Front, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 931, 946 (1999) (noting that judges sometimes “impute motives 
to [HIV exposure] defendants or infer an entire mindset from a single comment or action”); Kaplan, 
supra note 35, at 1552 (noting that courts have upheld convictions requiring substantial risks of 
transmission even where risks were negligible). 
46. See Klemm, supra note 37, at 522 (recognizing “the danger that jurors will unfairly apply 
expansive readings of a traditional criminal statute,” and arguing that legislative reform “can reign in 
both prosecutors and jurors” (emphasis added)); Amy L. McGuire, Comment, AIDS As a Weapon: 
Criminal Prosecution of HIV Exposure, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1787, 1815 (1999) (arguing that “prosecutors may 
twist the meaning of [statutory] elements to fit the crime of HIV transmission” (emphasis added)); cf. 
Zita Lazzarini et al., Criminalization of HIV Transmission and Exposure: Research and Policy Agenda, 8 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1350, 1352 (2013) (calling for “immediate policy interventions to assist prosecutors, 
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significance by advocating judicial discretion as a solution for statutory 
shortcomings.47 Commentators’ relative inattention to judicial decision making 
could limit attempts to inform interventions such as the REPEAL Act; for 
instance, though Sarah Newman provides suggestions for the legislative reform 
she hopes will be accomplished through the REPEAL Act,48 she mentions 
potential bias in judicial decision making only to support her argument for HIV-
specific statutes over prosecutions under general criminal law.49 
In this Note, I supplement the existing literature on HIV criminalization by 
identifying recurring failures in judicial decisions rendered in HIV exposure 
prosecutions, as well as in related cases and legal commentaries that may influence 
such decisions. Rather than focus, like Waldman, on prosecutions for aggravated 
assault or other particular charges,50 I organize my analysis thematically, grouping 
cases and commentaries on the basis of their shared failure to engage with distinct 
sources of knowledge on HIV and the HIV-positive. By doing so, I hope to 
provide evidence that judicial decisions in HIV exposure prosecutions can and 
should be improved by interventions, such as the REPEAL Act, that would help 
integrate these sources of knowledge into the law. 
II. HIV EXPOSURE DECISIONS AND COMMENTARY:  
NEGLECTED SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 
In this section, I identify recurring flaws in judicial decision making and legal 
commentary that I attribute to judges’ and commentators’ failure to engage with 
three sources of knowledge on HIV and the HIV-positive. First, judges and 
commentators have exaggerated transmission risks due to a failure to familiarize 
themselves with the science of HIV transmission, contributing to unjust 
convictions and sentences in HIV exposure prosecutions. Even where expert 
evidence on the improbability of transmission has been presented, judges have 
misapplied legal standards to circumvent that evidence and uphold unjust 
convictions. Second, judges and commentators have demonstrated little awareness 
of sexual health research on the limits of “disclosure”-based prevention strategies, 
and little sensitivity to the ethic, promoted by public health experts, of shared 
responsibility for transmission risks. Their impoverished understandings of sexual 
 
defense attorneys, and public health personnel to interpret and fairly apply [HIV-specific criminal] laws” 
(emphasis added)). 
47. See McCormick, supra note 2, at 425–27 (proposing an unusually draconian HIV exposure 
statute, and trusting judges to achieve proportionality between punishment and risks of transmission 
by applying mitigating factors at sentencing). 
48. Newman argues that Congress should pass the REPEAL Act, provide new guidelines for 
the reform of HIV-specific criminal statutes, and condition HIV services funding on states’ 
compliance with the guidelines. Newman, supra note 22, at 1427–29, 1435. She offers suggestions on 
how the federal government should craft the guidelines, favoring carefully drafted HIV-specific 
statutes that would, for instance, provide clear notice of the scientifically established modes of 
transmission sufficient to establish criminal liability. Id. at 1428–35. 
49. Id. at 1428. 
50. See Waldman, supra note 42, at 574; Talicska, supra note 41, at 471. 
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health strategies have contributed to the disproportionate punishment of 
“nondisclosure” defendants, as well as the unjustifiable punishment of HIV-
positive people who have “disclosed” to consenting partners. Finally, 
commentators’ failure to engage with the experiences and perspectives of the 
HIV-positive has likely deprived their analyses of insight, while further 
encouraging the overzealous prosecution of those who fail to “disclose.” In turn, 
judges’ failure to attend to the experience and perspectives of HIV exposure 
defendants themselves has led them to uphold and impose convictions without 
the required proof of a culpable mental state. 
My material consists of recent appellate opinions rendered in HIV exposure 
prosecutions, as well as related cases and commentaries. The judicial opinions I 
examine were gathered mostly in the summer of 2013 from law review articles, 
advocacy documents, and searches in the Westlaw database. To focus my critique 
on judicial decision making, I exclude opinions in which the result was dictated or 
persuasively suggested by the governing statute. Further, to render my analysis 
more relevant to contemporary and future interventions, I choose to examine only 
opinions rendered in the last decade (i.e., between 2004 and 2013). Perhaps most 
importantly, because my research methods limit my analysis to appellate opinions, 
they exclude the far vaster universe of unreviewed judicial decision making in trial 
courts. My analysis is qualitative and diagnostic rather than quantitative, and by 
necessity: a review of any substantial fraction of judicial decision making in HIV 
exposure prosecutions would be a task of real enormity, underscoring the need for 
government leadership in initiating systemic interventions. 
A. The Science of HIV Transmission 
It is much more difficult to transmit HIV, and to determine the precise 
degree of transmission risk from a particular exposure, than is commonly believed. 
Though prosecutors and judges have compared the probability of transmission 
from a sexual encounter to the likelihood of harm from a gunshot,51 in actuality, 
even by far the riskiest sexual activity—receptive anal sex without protection—has 
been estimated to pose less than a one-in-fifty chance of transmission.52 Estimates 
based solely on body parts, positioning, and condom use cannot, however, reliably 
assess the precise degree of transmission risk from any given incidence of sexual 
activity, which is affected by additional factors: these include the HIV-positive 
partner’s treatment and viral load,53 the infection of either partner with other 
 
51. See, e.g., State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 750 (Iowa 2006) (“[A ‘nondisclosure’ defendant] 
is just like the first-degree robber who attempts to inflict serious injury on his victim. And, just like 
the robber carrying a gun or a knife, [he] is armed with a dangerous virus capable of inflicting serious 
injury or death on the victim.”). 
52. See Marie-Claude Boily et al., Heterosexual Risk of HIV-1 Infection Per Sexual Act: Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies, 9 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 118, 118, 122 (2009); 
Eric Vittinghoff et al., Per-Contact Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission Between Male Sexual 
Partners, 150 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 306, 306, 310 (1999). 
53. E.g., HIV Transmission Risk, supra note 10 (explaining that high viral loads, typically 
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sexually transmitted infections,54 and the HIV-negative partner’s use of pre-
exposure prophylaxis (PrEP).55 
Unfortunately, judges and legal commentators often fail to engage with the 
complexity of HIV transmission, and their exaggerations of transmission risks 
contribute to unjust convictions and disproportionate sentences in HIV exposure 
prosecutions. Though commentators have recognized the impact of viral load on 
transmission risk and analyzed its legal relevance since at least 2009,56 other recent 
commentaries have omitted viral load when discussing factors that determine risks 
of transmission.57 More troublingly, some commentators have exaggerated the 
risks of transmission from performing oral sex,58 or have even legitimized illusory 
fears of transmission from casual contact.59 
Judicial rhetoric has likewise legitimized illusory or exaggerated fears of 
transmission.60 For instance, when a store clerk thwarted one defendant’s 
 
occurring in early and late stages of infection, increase transmission risk, while antiretroviral 
medications can reduce an HIV-positive individual’s infectiousness by up to ninety-six percent). 
54. E.g., The Role of STD Detection and Treatment in HIV Prevention - CDC Fact Sheet, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/std/hiv/stdfact-std-hiv.htm (last 
updated Sept. 1, 2010) (explaining that STI-related ulcers and inflammation can increase HIV-
negative individuals’ susceptibility to infection, and that STIs such as gonorrhea increase the 
infectiousness of HIV-positive individuals). 
55. See, e.g., Kristen Underhill, Paying for Prevention: Challenges to Health Insurance Coverage for 
Biomedical HIV Prevention in the United States, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 607, 618–19 (2012). PrEP is the use 
of antiretroviral drugs by HIV-negative individuals to protect themselves from HIV infection. See id. 
at 618. 
56. E.g., Grant, supra note 41, at 400–03 (arguing against use of low viral load as a mitigating 
factor in “nondisclosure” prosecutions); Leah H. Wissow, Comment, Public Health vs. Privacy: 
Rebalancing the Government Interest in Involuntary Partner-Notification Following Advancements in HIV 
Treatment, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 481, 483, 496–502 (2012) (arguing that partner-
notification statutes may be unconstitutional as applied to HIV-positive people who maintain an 
undetectable viral load). 
57. See Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV 531, 582–84 (2011) (failing to mention viral load when discussing factors that influence 
infection rates, including “transmission efficiency”); McCormick, supra note 2, at 425 (defining degree 
of transmission risks, for purposes of mitigation at sentencing, only by reference to condom use and 
type of sexual activity). 
58. See Bradford Bigler, Comment, Sexually Provoked: Recognizing Sexual Misrepresentation As 
Adequate Provocation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 783, 828–29 (2006) (indicating that an HIV-positive woman 
who performed oral sex on man without informing him of her HIV status exhibited “disregard for his 
safety,” and assuming the man would “reasonably” have foregone the oral sex if he knew her HIV 
status, in part due to the “high risk”). 
59. See Amanda Weiss, Comment, Criminalizing Consensual Transmission of HIV, 2006 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 389, 406 (2006) (warning that in addition to risk that infected sexual partner will sexually 
transmit HIV to others, the infected partner poses risk of “incidental exposure” to the general public). 
60. Though I focus on HIV exposure prosecutions, judges have exaggerated transmission 
risks in other contexts as well. See Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1553 (noting that judges in 
antidiscrimination cases have found HIV-positive employees to pose “direct threats” of transmission, 
contrary to medical evidence); Lisa M. Keels, “Substantially Limited:” The Reproductive Rights of Women 
Living with HIV/AIDS, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 389, 400–06 (2010) (critiquing Americans with 
Disabilities Act cases in which judges exaggerate risks of perinatal transmission and perpetuate the 
stigmatizing notion that the seropositive should not reproduce). 
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shoplifting attempt by dragging him to the ground, the defendant scratched the 
clerk and possibly tried to bite him while saying, “I’m HIV positive, let go of me, 
let go of me.”61 The defendant’s conduct posed a negligible risk of transmission, 
even if he did attempt to bite the clerk.62 However, in affirming the defendant’s 
conviction for felony menacing, the court held that a reasonable juror could find 
the defendant’s conduct “practically certain to cause fear.”63 Even worse, after the 
arresting officer in State v. Price was spit upon and bitten by an HIV-positive 
defendant with hemophilia, a panel of judges stated that the officer “had to limit 
his family interactions out of a concern that he had contracted HIV or Hepatitis C 
and would transfer them to his wife and children.”64 Of course, even in the 
unlikely event that the officer had contracted HIV, he would not have “had to” 
modify anything but his sexual relations with his wife—and there would be no 
reason at all to limit his interactions with his children.65 
Judicial ignorance of HIV transmission can have stark consequences for 
defendants in HIV exposure prosecutions. Judges have upheld outrageous 
sentences for spitting and biting based on mistaken impressions of the 
transmission risks,66 and exaggerations of sexual transmission risks likewise 
underlie the disproportionate sentences imposed or upheld by judges in 
“nondisclosure” prosecutions.67 Such sentences, and their lack of basis in the 
science of HIV transmission, are a recurring focus of the existing criticism.68 
Commentators, however, tend to focus on the manner in which legislatures have 
called for disproportionate sentences through HIV-specific statutes,69 and their 
 
61. People v. Shawn, 107 P.3d 1033, 1034–35 (Colo. App. 2004). 
62. HIV Transmission Risk, supra note 10. 
63. Shawn, 107 P.3d at 1035. 
64. State v. Price, 834 N.E.2d 847, 848, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
65. The court’s concern also would have been unwarranted if the officer had contracted 
hepatitis C, which, like HIV, is not transmitted through casual contact. See, e.g., Hepatitis C FAQs for the 
Public, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/ 
C/cFAQ.htm#transmission. 
66. See, e.g., United States v. Studnicka, 450 F. Supp. 2d 680, 681–82 (E.D. Tex. 2006) 
(upholding sentence enhancements for HIV-positive prisoner who bit guard’s arm because, due to 
“serious possibility of infection,” injury fell between “serious” and “permanent or life-threatening”); 
Gretel C. Kovach, Prison for Man with H.I.V. Who Spit on a Police Officer, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at 
A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/us/16spit.html?_r=0 (reporting a thirty-five 
year sentence for spitting under habitual offender statute). 
67. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 13 (reporting that an Iowa judge initially sentenced Nick 
Rhoades to twenty-five years in prison—2.5 times the maximum sentence available for sexual abuse 
of a child—for oral and anal sex without “disclosure,” even though Rhoades had an undetectable viral 
load and used a condom during anal sex). 
68. E.g., Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1536–39 & n.131 (comparing state punishments for 
endangerment offenses and HIV-exposure offenses, and noting that punishments in HIV-exposure 
prosecutions may exceed those available for playing Russian Roulette); Talicska, supra note 41, at 474–
75 (noting that convictions for biting and spitting are disproportionate to the transmission risks and 
sometimes exceed punishments for sex without “disclosure,” even though sexual transmission risks 
are much higher). 
69. Commentators often illustrate the disproportionate punishment of HIV exposure 
defendants through comparisons of the offense levels and sentence ranges set by HIV-specific 
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condemnation of sentences imposed or upheld by judges usually fails to 
interrogate the judges’ reasoning or to account for the role of prosecutorial zeal in 
determining the severity of sentences. I have thus sought to identify cases in 
which conviction and sentencing were influenced by judicial failure to engage with 
transmission knowledge. 
In one set of such cases, judges have explicitly rejected the need for any 
evidence on the degree of transmission risks posed by the defendant’s specific 
conduct.70 For instance, in Mathonican v. State, the court asserted that no expert 
testimony was needed for a jury to find that an HIV-positive man’s semen was a 
deadly weapon, even though the statute defined “deadly weapons” by their 
potential to harm in the manner of their intended use—a qualification potentially of 
great importance in the case, since the jury could have concluded that the 
defendant intended to emit his semen on or near his partner,71 which would 
present zero risk of transmission. Furthermore, in People v. Odom, the court upheld 
a prisoner’s sentence enhancement for spitting in an officer’s face after an 
altercation that allegedly left the defendant bleeding from the mouth, holding that 
the officer had been “subjected or exposed to a harmful biological substance” 
under the relevant statute.72 The court considered no expert evidence on the risks 
of transmission from the defendant’s conduct, instead merely taking judicial notice 
of the fact that blood can transmit HIV—and citing only a CDC advisory stating 
that blood can do so when it enters the body.73 Even the transmission knowledge cited 
by the court, then, should have led it to hold that facial contact with the defendant’s 
saliva, even if mixed with blood, did not “subject or expose” the officer to a 
harmful biological substance. 
Even where judges are presented with expert evidence on transmission risks, 
they have sometimes misapplied legal standards to that evidence in order to justify 
convictions. In State v. Price, the court affirmed an HIV-positive hemophiliac’s 
assault convictions for spitting at an arresting officer,74 disregarding a fundamental 
requirement of criminal law: that every element of a conviction be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s treating physician testified that there would 
be a low or remote risk of transmission even if an HIV-positive hemophiliac spat 
into another person’s mouth, but another doctor testified that the defendant’s 
saliva probably contained “microscopic blood” at least ninety-five percent of the 
 
criminal statutes to those set by other criminal statutes. See Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, 
Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws, 32 J.L. MED & ETHICS 327, 333–34 (2004); Kaplan, 
supra note 35, at 1536–37; Wolf & Vezina, supra note 38, at 859, 882. 
70. For an argument that conviction without proof of specific transmission risks violates due 
process, see Waldman, supra note 42, at 568–72. 
71. Mathonican v. State, 194 S.W.3d 59, 69, 70 & n.8 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); see also id. at 72 
(Ross, J., concurring and dissenting) (explaining why jury could not rationally conclude defendant’s 
semen was deadly weapon without expert testimony). 
72. People v. Odom, 740 N.W.2d 557, 560–62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). 
73. Id. at 561–62 & n.10. 
74. State v. Price, 834 N.E.2d 847, 847–50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
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time, and opined that a mixture of saliva and blood could potentially carry a high 
concentration of HIV.75 On appeal, the court found the doctors’ testimony 
“sufficient to establish that . . . [the defendant’s] saliva was a deadly weapon 
capable of inflicting physical harm to another.”76 The court should have 
recognized that a reasonable doubt remained regarding whether the defendant’s 
saliva was infectious: the doctor’s speculation about a potentially high concentration 
of HIV in the defendant’s saliva due to the presence of “microscopic blood” 
hardly proved its infectiousness beyond a reasonable doubt, especially given the 
doctor’s recognition that the defendant’s saliva may not have contained 
microscopic blood at the time of the incident.77 
Other judges have openly disregarded statutory requirements to affirm 
exposure convictions. In United States v. Dacus, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
aggravated assault charges for sex without “disclosure” and later, in light of expert 
testimony on the unlikelihood of transmission, sought to rescind his plea.78 The 
aggravated assault statute required that death or grievous bodily harm be the 
“likely” result of the defendant’s conduct, meaning “the natural and probable 
consequence of a particular use of any means.”79 Nevertheless, the court inquired 
only whether the defendant’s conduct posed “more than merely a fanciful, 
speculative or remote possibility” of death or grievous bodily harm—a probability 
standard inconsistent with the statute and derived solely from prior “HIV assault 
cases.”80 This lax standard enabled the court to conclude that there was no 
substantial conflict between the defendant’s plea and the expert evidence on the 
improbability of transmission.81 Sadly, despite the concurring judges’ suggestion 
that future courts should reassess this judicially invented probability standard,82 
and even after Dacus was roundly critiqued by Waldman,83 military judges have 
again applied its reasoning to affirm an HIV-positive man’s conviction for 
conduct posing only remote risks of transmission.84 
 
75. Id. at 849. 
76. Id. Though the court spoke only of “physical harm,” the statute defined “deadly weapon,” 
appropriately, as a thing capable of inflicting death. Id. at 848. 
77. Id. at 849. 
78. United States v. Dacus, 66 M.J. 235, 237 (C.A.A.F. 2008). During sentencing, an expert 
testified that because of the defendant’s undetectable viral load, the risk of transmission from sex was 
“very, very unlikely”—specifically, one in 50,000 with a condom and one in 10,000 even without a 
condom. Id. at 237, 240. 
79. Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 239–40. 
82. See id. at 240–41 (Ryan, J., concurring). 
83. Waldman, supra note 42, at 589–95. 
84. See United States v. Gutierrez, No. ACM 37913, 2013 WL 1319443, at *2–3 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. Mar. 21), set aside, 73 M.J. 128 (C.A.A.F. 2013); see also id. at *1 n.1 (dismissing objections 
of Dacus concurrence because they did not sway Dacus majority). 
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B. Research on Sexual Health Strategies 
Greater engagement with research on sexual health strategies could lead 
judges and commentators to an understanding of the limits of seroadaptation as a 
strategy for managing risks of sexual transmission. Seroadaptation is an umbrella 
term for sexual decision making based on knowledge or assumptions of HIV 
status.85 Common seroadaptive behaviors entail the use of prospective partners’ 
perceived HIV status to inform the following sexual decisions: whether to use a 
condom; which sexual activities to engage in, including, where appropriate, 
whether to assume the insertive or receptive position; and whether to have sex 
with a prospective partner at all.86 Seroadaptive behavior with respect to this last 
decision (the choice of partners) is known as “serosorting.”87 
Public health experts have acknowledged that information deficits limit 
seroadaptation’s efficacy as a prevention strategy.88 Because people cannot reliably 
determine prospective partners’ HIV status by appearance or other cues,89 their 
most reliable source of HIV status information is often the “disclosure” of an 
HIV-positive partner’s prior diagnosis. But those who have been diagnosed with 
HIV may not “disclose,” and those not diagnosed—who have been estimated to 
comprise one-fifth of the HIV-positive population, and who are more likely than 
their diagnosed counterparts to transmit the virus90—cannot “disclose.” Thus, a 
seroadapter may well reject a diagnosed partner on the basis of her “disclosure,” 
even if that prospective partner’s diagnosis has enabled her to receive treatment 
reducing or even eliminating her infectiousness, only to embrace riskier sex with 
an unknowingly HIV-positive partner with a high viral load. 
In addition to these limits on seroadaptation, sexual health research could 
also sensitize judges and commentators to the ethic of shared responsibility for 
managing sexual transmission risks. Prevention experts have long sought to instill 
a sense of accountability in the HIV-negative for their own health and for the 
transmission risks they create, thereby encouraging them to adopt more effective 
 
85. Willi McFarland et al., HIV Seroadaptation Among Individuals, Within Sexual Dyads, and by 
Sexual Episodes, Men Who Have Sex with Men, San Francisco, 2008, 23 AIDS CARE 261, 262 (2011); Ryan 
D. Murphy et al., Seroadaptation in a Sample of Very Poor Los Angeles Area Men Who Have Sex with Men, 17 
AIDS & BEHAV. 1862, 1862 (2013). 
86. See J. Jeff McConnell et al., Sexual Seroadaptation: Lessons for Prevention and Sex Research from a 
Cohort of HIV-Positive Men Who Have Sex with Men, PLOS ONE, Jan. 2010, at 1, 2 (2010); Murphy et al., 
supra note 85, at 1862–63. 
87. McConnell et al., supra note 86, at 2; Murphy et al., supra note 85, at 1862. The term 
“serosorting” is sometimes used more broadly, to encompass various seroadaptive behaviors. 
McFarland et al., supra note 85, at 261–62; Murphy et al., supra note 85, at 1862. For clarity, I use 
“serosorting” only to refer to the choice of partners on the basis of HIV status information. 
88. See, e.g., McFarland et al., supra note 85, at 261; Murphy et al., supra note 85, at 1863. 
89. E.g., Linda M. Niccolai et al., HIV-Infected Persons’ Knowledge of Their Sexual Partners’ HIV 
Status, 14 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 183, 187 (2002). 
90. H. Irene Hall et al., HIV Transmission in the United States: Considerations of Viral Load, Risk 
Behavior, and Health Disparities, 17 AIDS & BEHAV. 1632, 1632 (2013); Ann O’Leary & Richard J. 
Wolitski, Moral Agency and the Sexual Transmission of HIV, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 478, 478 (2009). 
            
508 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:493 
risk-management strategies.91 In the context of seroadaptation, for instance, the 
HIV-negative exercise more responsibility for their sexual health when they 
seroadapt only as a supplement to “universal precautions” taken with all 
partners,92 or seroadapt proactively by directly communicating about HIV status, 
rather than “seroguessing.”93 
These understandings have implications for HIV criminalization. The 
prosecution of consensual sex without affirmative “disclosure” of one’s HIV-
positive status imposes a legal duty on the HIV-positive to assist others in 
exercising their choice to seroadapt. One’s sense of the appropriate extent of this 
legal duty depends, first, on the value one attributes to the choice to seroadapt—
value limited by the information deficits discussed above. It also depends on the 
weight one gives to an HIV-positive person’s responsibility to assist a prospective 
partner in seroadaptive behaviors, even where the partner makes no effort to 
obtain the necessary information and adopts no universal precautions. The ethic 
of shared responsibility may affect this weight: if one expects HIV-negative 
individuals to proactively manage transmission risks, their failure to discuss HIV 
status or to adopt default prevention strategies—to the extent possible, given the 
power dynamics of the encounter94—can be read as consent to a greater degree of 
risk. These understandings of sexual health thus mitigate the moral culpability of 
those who engage in sex without “disclosure.”95 Furthermore, the ethic of shared 
responsibility cannot be reconciled with the punishment of the HIV-positive for 
sex with “disclosure”—that is, for sex with partners who consent to sex, and its 
attendant transmission risks, after being apprised of the HIV-positive person’s 
status. Sadly, judges and legal commentators’ failure to engage with these 
 
91. Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, Conflicting Messages: How Criminal HIV Disclosure 
Laws Undermine Public Health Efforts to Control the Spread of HIV, 10 AIDS & BEHAV. 451, 451, 455 
(2006); O’Leary & Wolitski, supra note 90, at 478. Recently, public health experts have moved away 
from a near-exclusive focus on this message and devoted increasing resources to interventions into 
risk behaviors by the HIV-positive. Id. But even those promoting this shift have not abandoned the 
ethic of shared responsibility. See id. at 487. 
92. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 91, at 453. For example, an HIV-negative gay man 
might use PrEP or resolve to use condoms even with partners presumed HIV-negative, but take 
additional precautions—e.g., only “topping” during anal sex; foregoing anal sex; or foregoing sex 
altogether—with a known HIV-positive partner. In contrast, the man would seroadapt as a substitute 
for other risk-management strategies if he adopted precautions only with partners known to be HIV-
positive. 
93. See Niccolai et al., supra note 89, at 188–89; Iryna B. Zablotska et al., Gay Men’s Current 
Practice of HIV Seroconcordant Unprotected Anal Intercourse: Serosorting or Seroguessing?, 21 AIDS CARE 501, 
502, 508 (2009) (defining “seroguessing” as “serosorting based on the assumption of seroconcordance 
rather than on direct discussion of [a] partner’s status”). 
94. Power imbalances between sexual partners may limit the ability of the relatively vulnerable 
to adopt prevention strategies. E.g., Stoever, supra note 6, at 1175–77. 
95. I do not argue that the choice to seroadapt has no value, or that the HIV-positive have no 
responsibility to assist prospective partners in exercising it. Nor am I attempting a nuanced analysis of 
the ethical dimensions of “nondisclosure.” My critique is targeted at the manner in which judges and 
commentators facilitate the universalizing, absolutist condemnation reflected in one commentator’s 
statement that “any intentional failure to disclos[e] one’s HIV-positive status to their partner is a 
paramount wrong.” McCormick, supra note 2, at 426 (emphasis added).  
            
2014] JUDGING HIV CRIMINALIZATION 509 
understandings of sexual health has helped sustain the disproportionate 
punishment of the HIV-positive for “nondisclosure,” as well as their continued 
punishment for fully informed, consensual sex. 
Judges have treated serosorting—the most “extreme” seroadaptive 
behavior—as natural and even inevitable, implying that its benefits are too great 
for any reasonable person to pass up. For instance, judges have implied that 
serodiscordant couples (in which one partner has HIV and the other does not96) 
cannot or should not have sex,97 and that knowledge of HIV status is so 
fundamentally, invariably material to the decision to have sex or abstain that 
“nondisclosure” negates a partner’s consent to sex.98 In at least one case, judges 
have even hinted that serosorting is so natural—and serodiscordant sex so 
irrational—that an HIV-negative rapist would feel compelled to spare an HIV-
positive victim.99 In addition to implicitly overstating the value of serosorting as a 
prevention strategy, this reasoning potentially endangers legal redress for HIV-
positive victims of rape.100 
Judges may overvalue serosorting because they fail to recognize the 
information deficits that limit the efficacy of all seroadaptive behaviors. For 
instance, in John B. v. Superior Court, a negligence suit in which the court recognized 
“reason to know” of one’s HIV-positive status as sufficient to trigger a duty to 
“disclose,”101 the court authorized discovery into the defendant’s extramarital 
sexual behavior for the following reason: “Evidence that John engaged in 
unprotected [casual] sex . . . might reasonably lead to the discovery of evidence as 
to John’s awareness of the HIV status of those partners . . . and thus may be 
relevant to whether John knew or had reason to know he was infected with 
HIV.”102 
The court thus suggested that John could reliably assess the degree of 
 
96. See generally Mixed-Status Couples, AIDS.GOV, http://aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/staying-
healthy-with-hiv-aids/friends-and-family/mixed-status-couples/ (last updated June 11, 2012). 
97. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008) (suggesting HIV 
“precludes intercourse” for serodiscordant couples, though endorsing their potential use of sex toys). 
98. See, e.g., Musser v. Mapes, 854 F. Supp. 2d 652, 667 (S.D. Iowa 2012); Commonwealth v. 
Cordoba, 902 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 2006). This logic is almost never applied to criminalize the 
“nondisclosure” of any other information that may be material to a prospective partner’s choice to 
consent or abstain, including information regarding STIs other than HIV. See John F. Decker & Peter 
G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and 
Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1132–47 (2011); Kaplan, supra note 35, at 
1525. 
99. Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284, 291 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he implications of Nance 
regarding Ms. Heath as HIV-positive draw into question whether he had the requisite intent to rape 
her.”). 
100. The naturalization of serosorting may also promote some forms of violence against the 
HIV-positive. See Stoever, supra note 6, at 1171–72, 1179 (noting that presumptions of HIV-positive 
undesirability may be exploited by abusers to prevent HIV-positive victims from leaving, or even 
encourage abusers to intentionally infect HIV-negative victims). 
101. John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 159–66 (Cal. 2006). 
102. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
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transmission risks he created through unprotected casual sex by counting the 
number of his partners he knew to be HIV-positive—without reference to factors, 
such as viral load and other STIs, affecting those partners’ infectiousness, or to the 
potentially greater risks created with HIV-positive partners who did not “disclose” 
or who had never been diagnosed.103 A dissenting justice further elided the HIV 
status information deficit in a somewhat insensitive hypothetical: 
[A]fter 25 years of widely available public information regarding the risk 
factors for HIV and the manner in which HIV is transmitted, one would 
think the potential sexual partner of an intravenous drug user bearing 
needle marks and showing signs of any kind of illness would, if not run 
for the nearest exit, insist on precautions against possible transmission of 
HIV.104 
Evidently, twenty-five years’ worth of prevention messages did not convince this 
justice to encourage the HIV-negative to adopt precautions with all casual 
partners, rather than relying on their perceived ability to determine who is 
“infected.”105 
In addition to overlooking the limits of seroadaptation as a prevention 
strategy, judges may encourage overzealous condemnation of “nondisclosure” by 
downplaying the HIV-negative’s shared responsibility for managing the sexual 
transmission risks they consent to creating. For instance, the defendant in State v. 
Kinder, without volunteering his HIV-positive status, had consensual sex with 
three men who worked for his online prostitution business, and who regularly had 
casual sex with strangers met online—at least sometimes without condoms.106 
None asked about the defendant’s HIV status or brought condoms.107 The men 
thus made no effort to obtain the information necessary to seroadapt, and they 
had already created substantial risks of their own infection by eschewing condoms 
 
103. At least one commentator has implied the same. See Mosiello, supra note 37, at 616–17 
(endorsing assessment of “reason to know” through past partners known to be HIV-positive, while 
rejecting assessment through past “risky” sex regardless of partners’ known or presumed HIV status); 
cf. Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1560 (suggesting juries should consider a “nondisclosure” defendant’s 
partner to have consented to a greater degree of transmission risks if she knew the defendant had 
previously slept with a partner known to be HIV-positive). 
104. John B., 137 P.3d at 182 (Moreno, J., dissenting). 
105. See also Fan, supra note 57, at 577 (arguing that without systems for reliable verification of 
HIV status, people “have to resort to crude heuristics of who is ‘clean’ . . . to determine if someone is a 
‘safe’ and healthy sexual partner” (emphasis added)). On a similar note, Russell Robinson offers 
“some hypothetical sexual scenarios in which arguably both partners have some responsibility for 
discussing HIV and safe sex,” including a scenario in which a woman’s friend tells her that a 
prospective sexual partner’s “face looks a little funny,” with pronounced cheekbones and a gaunt 
quality similar to those of an acquaintance with AIDS. Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 1463, 1520–22 (2009). Robinson makes excellent use of public health research to critique 
both HIV criminalization and “down low” narratives. See id. at 1467–68, 1471–72, 1515–32. But his 
critique would be yet more enlightening if it clarified that an individual’s HIV status cannot be 
determined through physical appearance, and that consenting sexual partners arguably share 
responsibility for managing transmission risks in all scenarios. 
106. State v. Kinder, No. 94722, 2011 WL 826284, at * 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2011). 
107. Id. at *2. 
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as a universal precaution with their casual partners. But the court flatly rejected the 
suggestion that these facts mitigated the defendant’s culpability.108 By giving the 
same unyielding weight to the HIV-positive’s moral duty to assist their partners in 
navigating transmission risks, judges communicate that transmission risks are 
unilaterally created by the HIV-positive,109 facilitating their punishment for 
degrees of risk to which their partners arguably consented. 
In fact, some judges have proved willing to punish the HIV-positive even for 
consensual sex with HIV-negative partners fully informed of their status, on the 
theory that the HIV-positive partner is solely responsible not only for the risks of 
transmission to the HIV-negative partner, but also, if that partner is infected, for 
any risks of transmission generated by her future activity.110 For instance, in United 
States v. Gutierrez , the defendant’s partners said that they would not have consented 
to sex with the defendant if he had “disclosed” his HIV status.111 However, in 
upholding the constitutionality of the defendant’s conviction for “indecent acts,” 
the court reasoned that his partners could not have consented to sex with him, 
because a person “cannot consent to an act that is likely to result in death or 
grievous bodily harm.”112 The court relied on a case that punished a defendant for 
consensual sex with a partner fully aware of his status, on the grounds that 
punishment was necessary to protect those whom the “misguided” consenting 
partner might subsequently infect.113 
Though the judges in Gutierrez only implied willingness to punish the HIV-
positive for fully informed, consensual sex, other judges have actually imposed 
such punishment in recent years. The trial court in State v. Rick, over the 
defendant’s objections, instructed the jury on a statutory provision criminalizing 
the “transfer” (medical donation) of certain bodily fluids and tissues, including 
sperm.114 The jury convicted the defendant on this charge, despite finding that he 
had “disclosed,” and the trial judge denied the defendant’s post-trial motion for 
 
108. See id. at *2 (“The fact the men may not live a conventional lifestyle, did not inquire 
about Kinder’s HIV status, and failed to provide condoms, are not defenses to Kinder failing to 
notify the victims he was HIV positive prior to having unprotected sex with them.”). 
109. Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) (stating that an HIV-positive woman 
who has sex to get pregnant “imposes on the man a significant risk of becoming infected.” (emphasis 
added)). 
110. One commentator, as well, has advocated prosecution of the HIV-positive for 
consensual and fully informed serodiscordant sex, albeit only where the partners intend to transmit the 
virus. Weiss, supra note 59, at 401–08. 
111. United States v. Gutierrez, No. ACM 37913, 2013 WL 1319443, at *1, *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. Mar. 21), set aside, 73 M.J. 128 (C.A.A.F. 2013). 
112. Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Bygrave, 46 M.J. 491 (C.A.A.F. 1997)). 
113. See Bygrave, 46 M.J. at 492, 496 (“The Government’s interests in the present case . . . 
encompass the health of any sexual partners [the defendant’s partner] may have in the future, any 
children she may bear, and anyone else to whom she may potentially transmit HIV through nonsexual 
contact.”), aff’g 40 M.J. 839, 842 (N-M. C.M.R. 1994) (“In giving her misguided consent to infection 
with a potentially deadly virus, Petty Officer C does not speak for those she might subsequently 
infect.”). 
114. See State v. Rick, 821 N.W.2d 610, 612, 615–16 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
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acquittal or a new trial.115 The trial judge thus enforced an interpretation of the 
statute that criminalized an HIV-positive person’s participation in fully informed, 
consensual sex.116 Furthermore, the trial judge was not alone in believing the 
punishment warranted—when the court of appeals reversed the conviction, the 
dissenting judge protested that the trial court’s interpretation was necessary to 
protect public health.117 
A similarly draconian desire to protect public health led another judge to 
impose civil punishment for an offer of informed, consensual sex. When Jose 
Ramirez, undocumented and homeless, offered to perform oral sex on an 
undercover officer in exchange for money, an Immigration Judge found that his 
HIV-positive status rendered his offer a “particularly serious crime,” justifying the 
termination of his withholding of removal118—and clearing the way for his 
deportation. Most disturbingly, the judge held that Ramirez’s intent to “disclose” 
was irrelevant, reasoning that his client’s knowledge of his HIV status could not 
“mitigate the danger [his] behavior posed to the subsequent sexual partners of his 
client.”119 
Though the punishments imposed in Rick and Ramirez were reversed or 
vacated,120 the judicially imposed imprisonment of another HIV-positive man for 
fully informed, consensual sex was apparently allowed to stand. In State v. Eversole, 
the trial court revoked a defendant’s probation and sentenced him to two years of 
imprisonment for technical noncompliance with his parole order, which required 
him to bring prospective sexual partners to his probation officer for written 
confirmation that they knew his HIV status.121 The defendant’s noncompliance 
was only technical because the partner whom he failed to present for the court’s 
approval admittedly knew the defendant’s HIV status when he consented to the 
alleged sexual contact.122 On appeal, the court did not pretend to be bound to 
uphold the punishment.123 Nevertheless, the court found that the trial court had 
acted within its discretion, speculating that the parole order may have been 
 
115. Id. at 612. 
116. Id. at 616.  
117. Id. at 620 (Collins, J., dissenting). 
118. Brief for Amici Curiae American Academy of HIV Medicine et al. on Behalf of 
Respondent at 1–3, Ramirez, (No. A075986662), available at http://www lambdalegal.org/in-
court/legal-docs/ramirez_ca-amicus-brief. 
119. Id. at 2. 
120. The Board of Immigration Appeals vacated the Immigration Judge’s Ramirez decision 
after the federal government, apparently swayed by advocates, ceased its efforts to deport Ramirez. 
See Ramirez, A075986662 (B.I.A. May 31, 2013), available at http://www lambdalegal.org/in-
court/legal-docs/in-re-ramirez_us_20130531_decision. 
121. State v. Eversole, 912 N.E.2d 643, 645 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 
122. Id. 
123. The court recognized that a probationer is entitled to liberty if he “substantially abides by 
the conditions of his supervision.” Id. at 647. It discussed precedent reinstating a defendant’s 
probation where the defendant had been ordered not to contact minors without the probation 
department’s approval, but neglected to secure that approval when marrying a minor. Id. at 647 (citing 
State v. Thompson, 782 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)). 
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designed to achieve several goals beyond ensuring “disclosure”—most notably, to 
“safeguard subsequent sexual partners of [the unapproved partner].”124 In other 
words, the court acknowledged the possibility that the trial court sought to 
discourage HIV-negative individuals from making their own informed decision to 
have sex with the defendant—and suggested the court had discretion to 
reimprison the defendant for allowing his partners that choice. 
C. HIV-Positive Experience and Perspectives 
The value of attention to the lived experiences of the HIV-positive has been 
recognized by advocates in the United States and abroad,125 as well as by the 
federal government.126 It has also been demonstrated in the work of a select few 
legal commentators who have highlighted HIV-positive voices and experiences.127 
Judicial decisions and legal commentary, however, often suffer from a failure to 
engage with the experiences and perspectives of the HIV-positive. This failure 
deprives the law of the benefits of such engagement, including the potential to 
enrich legal analysis. More concretely, it contributes to the disproportionate 
punishment of “nondisclosure” defendants and the unjust conviction of other 
exposure defendants without proof of intent to harm. 
Attending to a broad spectrum of HIV-positive experience has the potential 
 
124. Id. at 648. The court also suggested that enforcing technical compliance with the order 
may have been reasonable to ensure that the defendant and his partners were reminded to practice 
safe sex. Id. But this goal was not incorporated into the terms of the order, since the parole officer 
was not required (or qualified) to advise the partners on safe sex, and she never did. Id. at 648–49 
(Donovan, J., dissenting). Finally, the court cited the goal of requiring the defendant to “act 
responsibly and respect lawful authority.” Id. at 648 (majority opinion). But this goal, if recognized as 
sufficient to punish noncompliance, could justify any parole condition, however unjust. 
125. For instance, prominent HIV-positive advocate Sean Strub faulted the authors of the 
“We the LGBT” video and statement for failing to identify anyone in the video as HIV-positive, or to 
conduct outreach to any of the “five national networks of people with HIV in the U.S. that were 
created by and are run/controlled by people with HIV.” See Sean Strub, We the LGBT? What About Us 
with HIV?, POZ BLOGS (June 3, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://blogs.poz.com/sean 
/archives/2013/06/we_the_lgbt_what_abo.html. International organizations also recognize the value 
of bringing the experience of the HIV-positive to the forefront. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS JOINT 
PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS & INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW ORGANIZATION, 
TOOLKIT: SCALING UP HIV-RELATED LEGAL SERVICES 33 (2009) (“Testimony from people living 
with HIV about their experiences with the legal system is a very powerful way to challenge attitudes 
and convey the reality of living with HIV.”), available at http://issuu.com/idlonews/docs/hivtoolkit. 
126. E.g., WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POLICY, supra note 23, at 35, 37 
(recommending promotion of public leadership by HIV-positive people and recognizing that 
historically, “an essential element of what has caused social attitudes to change has been when the 
public sees and interacts with people who are openly living with HIV”). 
127. See Cynthia Chandler et al., Community-Based Alternative Sentencing for HIV-Positive Women in 
the Criminal Justice System, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 66, 69–73, 85–90 (1999) (presenting views and 
experiences of HIV-positive coauthors Gwen Patton and Jenny Job); Keels, supra note 60, at 390, 410 
(reporting HIV-positive women’s experiences with stigma discouraging them from having children); 
Stoever, supra note 6, at 1169–73, 1175–79 (highlighting stories from HIV-positive survivors of 
domestic violence); cf. Perone, supra note 9, at 363 n.† (2013) (thanking HIV-positive individuals for 
sharing stories with the author and enriching her understanding). 
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to enrich legal analysis by calling attention to the ways in which HIV, stigma, and 
legal doctrine play out in diverse HIV-positive lives.128 For instance, through her 
representation of HIV-positive clients and other domestic violence survivors 
affected by HIV, Jane Stoever has recognized seven categories of HIV-motivated 
violence largely ignored by legal scholarship.129 Further, HIV-positive experience 
may inform the attempts of some HIV criminalization commentators to 
complicate the meaning of “disclosure” and of consent to transmission risks. 
Kaplan, for example, discusses verbal and non-verbal cues that the HIV-positive 
may use in lieu of “disclosure,” suggesting that members of “the gay-male 
community” often possess some sophistication in navigating these cues.130 As a 
participant in a gay male community, however, I am skeptical that a substantial 
number of gay men are attuned to such subtle cues as the presence of HIV 
medications.131 On the contrary, several men with whom I have interacted online 
have proven so unsophisticated in navigating HIV status information that they 
have even neglected to read the portion(s) of my profile plainly listing my status. 
Some of these men have invited me to have sex with them, only to rescind the 
invitation after I “disclosed” my HIV-positive status more directly—raising the 
question of whether I would be subject to conviction under a “nondisclosure” 
statute had I slept with them after “disclosing” my status only on my profile. 
Despite the salience of this legal question in the lives of the many HIV-positive 
people looking for sex and romance online, I have yet to see any commentator 
address it. 
Engagement with HIV-positive perspectives may also lead to greater 
proportionality of punishment in “nondisclosure” prosecutions. Rather than 
interrogating the experiences and perspectives that lead some HIV-positive people 
to engage in sex without “disclosure,” the media has long indulged the public’s 
prurient fascination with men, such as Philippe Padieu and Nushawn Williams, 
who have repeatedly engaged in sex without “disclosure.”132 Recently, the media 
has also developed a fascination with Black men “on the down low,” who have 
sex with women without telling them that they also have sex with men, and who 
are portrayed as a chief cause of HIV infections among Black women.133 Some 
 
128. Given the exposure of many HIV-positive people to HIV care, and their personal 
interest in challenging transmission ignorance, commentators connected to the HIV-positive may also 
be less likely to omit or misrepresent knowledge of HIV transmission in the ways discussed above. See 
supra pp. 502–03. 
129. Stoever, supra note 6, at 1160 n.4, 1167–80 & n.49. 
130. Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1550–51 & n.199; see also Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 91, at 
456. 
131. See Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1550; Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 91, at 456; Robinson, 
supra note 105, at 1521. 
132. See, e.g., Catherine Hanssens, AIDS Criminals and Innocent Victims: Is There Anything Wrong 
with This Picture?, CTR. FOR HIV L. & POL’Y (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org 
/fine-print-blog/aids-criminals-and-innocent-victims-there-anything-wrong-picture (critiquing press 
coverage of Padieu and relating it to coverage of Williams). 
133. Robinson, supra note 105, at 1469–78. 
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commentators have echoed these alarmist tales of “AIDS predators” and men on 
the down low. For instance, commentators have employed sensationalistic 
references to Williams and Padieu to add “spice” to their articles.134 This 
technique resembles that used by the publishers of Randy Shilts’s famous book 
And the Band Played On, who successfully courted publicity by inaccurately 
portraying “predator” Gaëtan Dugas as “Patient Zero”135—a narrative that 
commentators have referenced without any mention of its epidemiological 
inaccuracy.136 Finally, at least one commentator has perpetuated hysterical media 
accounts of the public health threat posed by men on the down low, arguing that 
current privacy protections for HIV status information “giv[e] rise to a pandemic 
in the Black community” and that “[t]he need to reach the ‘down-low’ 
phenomenon is critical to saving the lives of Black women and girls.”137 These 
commentators’ failure to engage with circumstances that may mitigate the 
culpability of those who engage in sex without “disclosure,”138 or to more 
thoughtfully assess the impact such people have on the epidemic,139 may 
contribute to the disproportionate punishment of defendants in “nondisclosure” 
prosecutions. 
Judges’ similar unwillingness to engage with the mindsets and circumstances 
of HIV exposure defendants can lead to unjust convictions without the required 
proof of mens rea. Since statutes criminalizing sex without “disclosure” use the 
defendant’s knowledge of her HIV status as a proxy for a culpable mental state,140 
the issue is not particularly salient in prosecutions under those statutes. But the 
issue is of critical importance in prosecutions requiring proof of intent to harm or 
 
134. See Fan, supra note 57, at 533–34 (beginning with account of Philippe Padieu and this 
sensationalistic sentence: “Venturing online to jumpstart her love live after divorce, Diane Reeve met 
the man who would give her AIDS”); Markus, supra note 2, at 847–48 (opening with sensationalistic 
account of Nushawn Williams’s “killing spree”). 
135. See PHIL TIEMEYER, PLANE QUEER: LABOR, SEXUALITY, AND AIDS IN THE HISTORY 
OF MALE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS 168–80 (2013). 
136. See Christina M. Shriver, State Approaches to Criminalizing the Exposure of HIV: Problems in 
Statutory Construction, Constitutionality and Implications, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 319, 319–20 & n.2 (2001) 
(referring to Dugas as “Patient Zero” and implying that he “helped contribute to the dramatic spread 
of AIDS during the early days of the epidemic”); McArthur, supra note 36, at 713, 737. 
137. Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, A Cautionary Tale: Black Women, Criminal Justice, and HIV, 19 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 423–28 (2012). 
138. E.g., Dalton, supra note 45, at 946–48 (linking documentary subject Fabian Bridges’ 
“nondisclosure” to poverty and the absence of institutional and familial support); Kaplan, supra note 
35, at 1541–42 (describing varying interests defendants may have in sexual activity and in 
“nondisclosure”); Stoever, supra note 6, at 1169–71 (describing “disclosure”-motivated abuse and 
violence). Mitigating circumstances may exist even in the most notorious cases: commentators have 
noted that Nushawn Williams was diagnosed with schizophrenia and that he claimed he did not 
believe he was infected with HIV, suspecting health officials were only trying to drive him out of 
town for having sex with White women. Burris et al., supra note 36, at 509; Wolf & Vezina, supra note 
38, at 824–25. 
139. See Robinson, supra note 105, at 1467–68, 1470–72 (explaining that there is limited 
empirical evidence on the prevalence of down low behavior and its public health impact, and pointing 
to alternative explanations for HIV infections in Black women). 
140. Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1532–34. 
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to kill, such as those targeting HIV-positive aggressors for assault and attempted 
murder. HIV-positive people may engage in acts of aggression such as spitting and 
biting, and even explicitly threaten to infect their targets, without genuinely 
intending to infect them—indeed, quite likely knowing that their actions present 
no realistic chance of transmission.141 Life with HIV renders the HIV-positive 
painfully aware of the public’s irrational fears of transmission, and we may be 
tempted to exploit those fears in the heat of a confrontation. Giving in to that 
temptation may not be admirable, but it is a far cry from a desire to maim or kill. 
Judges, however, have proven ready to impute such desires to HIV-positive 
defendants on the basis of minimal evidence.142 For instance, in State v. Price, the 
court relied on an HIV-positive hemophiliac’s “knowledge of his illnesses” to find 
sufficient evidence that he knew his saliva was a deadly weapon when spitting at 
an arresting officer.143 If the court simply meant that the defendant knew he was a 
hemophiliac and infected with HIV, such knowledge is grossly insufficient to 
establish knowledge of the infectiousness of his saliva due to these conditions.144 The 
year after Price, another panel of the court affirmed an HIV-positive defendant’s 
conviction for attempted felonious assault on a police officer after he spat in an 
arresting officer’s eye, relying on Price and the officer’s testimony that he 
“observed what he believed to be blood in the saliva that he cleaned out of his 
eye.”145 The court cited no evidence that the defendant knew his saliva contained 
blood (if, in fact, it did),146 or that he believed the presence of blood created a risk 
of transmission sufficient to render his saliva a deadly weapon. Instead, the court 
simply inferred nefarious intent from the fact that the defendant had previously 
spat on a police officer, told him he was HIV-positive, and said, “I should have 
 
141. Dalton, supra note 45, at 941. 
142. Commentators, also, have denied the complexity of HIV-positive aggressors’ mental 
states by indicating that a simple threat, or even a “menacing” laugh, may be sufficient to dispel a 
reasonable doubt regarding a defendant’s intent to transmit. See McCabe, supra note 41, at 774; Jaclyn 
Schmitt Hermes, Note, The Criminal Transmission of HIV: A Proposal to Eliminate Iowa’s Statute, 6 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 473, 488–89 (2002). 
143. State v. Price, 834 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
144. Did the defendant know that his saliva might contain “microscopic blood”? See id. Did 
he believe that the presence of microscopic blood in his saliva rendered it capable of inflicting 
death—despite widespread recognition, even by at least one member of the court, that saliva generally 
poses no risk of HIV transmission? See id. at 848–49 (quoting State v. Bird, 692 N.E.2d 1013 (Ohio 
1998) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (finding “nothing suggesting that the saliva of an HIV-positive person 
can transmit the disease to another”)). Did he know all of this during an encounter with police 
responding to his “nonsensical” calls, implying that his mental state may have been impaired? See id. at 
847–48. The court was silent on these points, which should have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
145. See State v. Branch, No. L-05-1269, 2006 WL 2045911, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App., July 21, 
2006). 
146. Other than the officer’s asserted belief, the court mentioned no evidence that blood was 
present in the defendant’s saliva, and offered no explanation for its presence: the court did not 
suggest that the defendant was struck during or prior to the arrest. See id. at *1, *3. 
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spit in your mouth”—without citing any evidence of the defendant’s knowledge or 
mental state when making those statements.147 
Other judges have gone even further, using a defendant’s threatening 
statements while spitting as the basis for imposing a conviction. In State v. Ingram, 
the defendant was beaten by an officer and bitten on the head by a police dog 
while being arrested for stealing small items.148 While being led to an officer’s car 
in handcuffs, he spat in the officer’s face, told him he was HIV-positive, and said 
he hoped the dog developed AIDS.149 A jury convicted the defendant of criminal 
exposure to HIV, but the reviewing court reversed the conviction because the 
state had failed to establish that exposure to the defendant’s saliva posed a 
significant risk of transmission.150 Nevertheless, the court took it upon itself to 
impose an attempt conviction, finding the defendant’s statements to be sufficient 
proof that he believed spitting in the officer’s face would expose him to a significant 
risk of transmission.151 The court was not even deferring to a jury’s fact finding—
the court imposed the conviction, despite the flimsy evidence of intent, on its own 
accord.152 
In suggesting that these problems may be remedied if judges and 
commentators more closely attend to the perspectives and experiences of the 
HIV-positive, I do not mean to suggest that lived experience with HIV leads to 
one correct perspective on law and policy. It should be evident in this Note that I 
personally oppose HIV criminalization, and my stance on the issue is informed by 
my direct experience with HIV and its stigma. But other commentators have 
invoked HIV-positive experiences—albeit of third parties, and focusing on the 
experience of infection—to advocate HIV criminalization.153 I also would caution 
that attention to the lived experiences of the HIV-positive should respect the 
diversity of that experience. As a gay, middle-class White man infected through 
casual sex, my experiences, concerns, and privileges may color my perspective; for 
 
147. See id. at *1–4. 
148. State v. Ingram, No. W2011-02595-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5355694, at *1–3 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2012). 
149. Id. at *2. 
150. Id. at *5. 
151. See id. at *5. 
152. The defendant’s stated hope that the police dog would develop AIDS, even if sincere, 
could only demonstrate that the defendant believed his blood could infect a dog that ingested it, not 
that he believed his saliva could infect a person even without entering the body. The court cited no 
evidence regarding the defendant’s knowledge of transmission routes and no evidence regarding the 
defendant’s state of mind—for instance, none rebutting the possibility that, in his anger after being 
caught, beaten, and attacked by a dog, the defendant was merely engaging in petty rebellion by 
attempting to play on the officer’s irrational fears of transmission. 
153. See Marc Spindelman, Sexuality’s Law, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 87, 88–89, 216 & 
n.582, 226–27 (2013) (protesting an allegedly small number of legal actions for sexual transmission 
between gay men, and encouraging HIV-positive gay men to use their “lived, practical knowledge” to 
reclaim transmission as legal harm); McCormick, supra note 2, at 407 & n.1, 416–17 (arguing for 
criminalization “from a purely retribution standpoint” and identifying infection of author’s father as 
inspiration for article). 
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instance, by predisposing me to contemplate “disclosure” in the context of casual, 
noncommercial sex between same-sex partners, possibly leading me to overlook 
different concerns surrounding “disclosure” in sex work or in committed (and 
potentially abusive) heterosexual relationships. My identity and experiences may 
resonate with an image of the HIV-positive that remains dominant in certain 
circles, but they leave me ill-equipped to provide the types of insight available 
from the experiences—with prison, pregnancy, domestic violence, and more—
shared by the HIV-positive women given voice in other commentaries.154 
III. DISLODGING JUDGES’ “STICKY INTUITIONS” 
I offer the foregoing analysis as evidence of a need for interventions into 
judicial decision making in HIV exposure prosecutions. There is no blueprint for 
such interventions, but to begin framing them, it may be wise to ask why judges fail 
to engage with public health research and the HIV-positive as sources of 
knowledge. Suzanne Goldberg has shed some light on this question by examining 
one reason we all, at times, deem it unnecessary to consult outside sources of 
knowledge: intuitive thinking.155 Goldberg questions why judges, despite advances 
in understanding that have fueled the growing momentum in the fight for gay 
rights, “continue to promote and sustain restrictions on the rights of lesbians and 
gay men.”156 She attributes the phenomenon to “a set of intuitions, impulses, 
instincts, and so-called commonsense views regarding sexual orientation and 
gender . . . [that] have maintained their influence well after being undermined by 
both data and shifts in societal views.”157 She proceeds to sketch a typology of 
these “sticky intuitions” as they manifest in judicial decisions, as well as in 
scholarship and public discourse.158 
Like the decisions examined by Goldberg, the opinions I have critiqued in 
this Note arguably reflect “a wide range of nonanalytically derived beliefs.”159 For 
instance, that transmission is likely when an HIV-negative individual has sex with 
an HIV-positive person, or comes into any manner of contact with an HIV-
positive person’s blood; that sex with a partner known to be HIV-positive 
invariably presents greater transmission risks than sex with a partner presumed to 
be HIV-negative; that the HIV-negative do not create transmission risks and are 
not responsible for them; and that the HIV-positive are often willing to 
deliberately infect others, while simultaneously unaware that biting, scratching, and 
spitting are poor methods of doing so. Acceptance of such “sticky intuitions” as 
 
154. See Chandler et al., supra note 127, at 69–73, 85–90; Keels, supra note 60, at 390, 410; 
Stoever, supra note 6, at 1169–73, 1175–79. 
155. See Goldberg, supra note 17. 
156. Id. at 1378. 
157. Id. at 1379. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 1380. 
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commonsense truth might underlie some judges’ failure to attend to outside 
sources that could offer contrary evidence and perspectives. 
If intuitive thinking is indeed at work in these cases, what can be done about 
it? Goldberg warns that because people “tend to evaluate the persuasiveness of 
new information based on its conformity to their experience,” the presentation of 
facts contrary to harmful intuitions may be insufficient to destabilize them.160 
However, factual contestation may be more effective in the context of HIV 
criminalization, at least with respect to intuitions concerning HIV 
transmission161—judges may be less ready to discount the persuasiveness of 
authorities on a subject so scientific and arcane. Advocates should thus make good 
use of resources on the science of HIV, such as those prepared specifically for 
advocates by the Positive Justice Project.162 But other intuitions at work in these 
cases are likely less susceptible to factual contestation because they concern 
subjects more psychological or cultural.163 Helpfully, Goldberg explores 
alternatives to factual contestation, drawing on cognitive theory to identify two 
strategies for destabilizing antigay intuitions: exposing decision makers to the 
presence and voices of gay people (the contact hypothesis) and encouraging 
decision makers to imagine themselves in gay people’s figurative shoes (role 
taking).164 
Advocates and commentators might make use of these strategies to 
influence judicial decision making in HIV exposure prosecutions. Litigators can 
place judges in “contact” with the HIV-positive through in-depth personal 
testimony by HIV-positive witnesses, or through the incorporation of HIV-
positive people’s stories and voices into written submissions such as amicus 
briefs.165 Commentators can also encourage such “contact” by collaborating with 
the HIV-positive in their work, either by cowriting a piece with HIV-positive 
collaborators166 or, more simply, by documenting their words and experiences.167 
Through creative role-taking strategies, litigators and commentators might also 
encourage judges to identify with the HIV-positive. One strategy is simply to ask 
judges to do so, perhaps through a narrative in the second person.168 Another 
 
160. Id. at 1408. 
161. See Lazzarini et al., supra note 46, at 1351–52. 
162. See, e.g., POSITIVE JUSTICE PROJECT, TRANSMISSION ROUTES, VIRAL LOADS AND 
RELATIVE RISKS: THE SCIENCE OF HIV FOR LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES, CTR. FOR HIV L. & 
POL’Y (June 2011), http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/transmission-routes-viral-loads-and-
relative-risks-science-hiv-lawyers-and-advocates. 
163. See Lazzarini et al., supra note 46, at 1352 (noting that empirical data cannot directly help 
resolve questions of values, such as the balance of responsibility for transmission risks). 
164. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 1408–10. 
165. See id. at 1409 & n.146. 
166. See Chandler et al., supra note 127, at 69. 
167. See Keels, supra note 60, at 390, 410; Stoever, supra note 6, at 1169–73, 1175–79. 
168. Jaclyn Hermes has used this strategy with her readers, opening her Note by instructing 
readers to imagine themselves as an eighteen-year-old boy who is revealed, through a story 
highlighting his fear of “disclosing” his status to his prom date, to be HIV-positive. Hermes, supra 
note 142, at 473. 
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strategy is to present a judge with a hypothetical legal regime imposing burdens on 
the HIV-negative analogous to those currently imposed on the HIV-positive.169 
Advocates might posit, for example, a law seeking to promote seroadaptation by 
criminalizing the failure to “disclose” one’s HIV status regardless of whether it is 
negative or positive. Finally, Goldberg suggests that “attention to language may do 
some work in bridging differences and reshaping intuitions.”170 In this vein, 
advocates might destabilize harmful intuitions by, for example, shifting discourse 
in prosecutions for consensual sex from “disclosure” to seroadaptation,171 and by 
contesting judges’ and prosecutors’ use of stigmatizing metaphors, such as those 
equating HIV transmission with death.172 
Piecemeal attempts to influence individual judges as HIV exposure 
prosecutions arise are not, of course, the ideal response to the influence of HIV-
related ignorance and stigma in our courts; pervasive problems beg for systemic 
interventions. Goldberg briefly references one “top-down” prospective approach 
to destabilizing intuitions, noting that judges can be exposed to both role taking 
strategies and up-to-date factual information in judicial trainings like those 
provided by the Williams Institute.173 If the REPEAL Act is enacted, the inclusion 
of such trainings in the required best practice recommendations to states might 
lead to substantial progress in the dissemination of public health knowledge and 
HIV-positive perspectives among the judiciary.174 Of course, judges are people, 
and their decision making will always reflect the culture in which they are situated; 
interventions in the judiciary will likely never succeed unless contextualized within 
broader efforts to educate the public and eradicate HIV stigma.175 
 
169. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 1410. 
170. Id. at 1410–11 (pointing to LGBT rights lawyers’ efforts to frame debates in terms of 
same-sex couples’ sexual intimacy and marriage rights rather than “homosexual sodomy” or “same-
sex marriage”). 
171. A focus on the HIV-negative partner’s frustrated desire to seroadapt emphasizes that 
she, and not only the HIV-positive defendant, was creating and navigating transmission risks. Further, 
the mere naming of seroadaptive behaviors—particularly serosorting—divests them of a sense of 
naturalness or inevitability and clarifies that they are only particular strategies in managing 
transmission risks. 
172. See, e.g., Trevor Hoppe, From Sickness to Badness: The Criminalization of HIV in Michigan, 101 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 139, 143–45 (2013) (describing persistence of “death narratives” in Michigan 
“nondisclosure” prosecutions). 
173. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 1411 n.158.  
174. Jane Stoever has also recommended that existing judicial trainings on domestic violence 
raise judges’ awareness of its intersections with HIV and involve judges in exploring responses. 
Stoever, supra note 6, at 1216–17 & n.220. 
175. Angela Perone has proposed educational campaigns against stigma as part of a proactive, 
non-punitive approach to “responding to inequality emanating from HIV criminalization laws.” 
Perone, supra note 9, at 394–406. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: LISTEN REAL LOUD176 
In an interview with the ACT UP Oral History Project, Mary Dorman 
recounts how she first became a lawyer for the famous HIV activist group when, 
while attending a demonstration, she was asked to represent some of the hundreds 
of ACT UP members arrested there.177 When the judge called fifteen male 
arrestees into the court, Dorman—initially terrified because she had little 
experience in criminal law—gained strength from the sight of the ACT UP 
members holding hands in the courtroom, sporting bright red lipstick.178 But 
when her clients were called at a follow-up proceeding, Dorman noticed a less 
welcome sight: court employees, evidently fearing “contamination” from the HIV 
activists, donning rubber gloves.179 Perhaps emboldened by her clients’ own 
unapologetic style, Dorman took the unusual step of confronting the judge: 
I said that I’d observed court officers wearing gloves when my clients 
were present. And it was my obligation to advise my clients that I’d 
perceived that to be a violation of the law—that they were being 
disparately treated because they were perceived to be disabled. And that 
he was the highest officer in the court, and I would have to advise them 
to make their complaints against him, because only he could order the 
gloves taken off, and he should know that it was against their rights to 
have court officers in his courtroom wear rubber gloves.180 
According to Dorman, the judge simply stormed off in response, and her clients 
sent him off with ACT UP’s signature chant: “ACT UP, [f]ight back, [f]ight 
AIDS!”181 
Such spectacular manifestations of HIV stigma are no longer common in 
U.S. courts. But I include Dorman’s anecdote as a reminder that “fighting AIDS” 
has always meant fighting stigma, particularly as it infects our government and our 
law—and that lawyers have joined that fight since the early days, serving as key 
advocates for the HIV-positive. Though its presence is more subtle, HIV stigma 
remains in our courts, codified in statutes and enacted in decisions by prosecutors, 
juries, and judges. To follow the example of lawyers like Dorman, today’s lawyers 
should support the REPEAL Act and other interventions against HIV stigma in 
 
176. I have derived the title of this section from an article documenting the perspectives of 
several HIV-positive women prisoner activists on public safety and the criminal justice system. See 
Cynthia Chandler & Carol Kingery, Yell Real Loud: HIV-Positive Women Prisoners Challenge Constructions of 
Justice, 27 SOC. JUST. 150 (2000). The title of that article, in turn, is derived from the testimony of one 
of the activists, Rebecca: 
To be an activist in prison you need to talk to, and for, people who don’t have a voice or 
the courage to talk in front of others. You have to find out what the problems are, pass on 
the information to others, yell real loud, and not be afraid of what might happen to you. 
Id. at 153. 
177. Interview by Sarah Schulman with Mary Dorman, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 17, 2003), 
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the law. Even in the absence of such formal interventions, lawyers should listen—
and encourage judges to listen—to sources of knowledge on HIV and the HIV-
positive, including public health research and the HIV-positive themselves. 
 
